Welcome to the wechat subscription number of chuangshiji
By Gong Jinhui
Source: Gong Jinhui (ID: gongjinhui2)
As we all know, bat (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent) have been dominating one side for a long time. In addition, TMD (byte skipping, meituan and didi) have emerged in recent years, which together constitute the extremely powerful existence of China’s Internet. However, no matter how powerful they are, they can’t be invincible all the time. It’s inevitable that they will lose. There are one or two weak points that are normal.
In other words, don’t be too mythical. Bat and TMD, which are regarded as the top stream of China’s Internet, have their own difficulties. The road of development can’t be smooth. There are always one or two businesses or products that fail and fail in a mess. It’s not too good to describe them as “the mud can’t support the wall”. Don’t believe it? Then look down at the embarrassing moment when they stumbled:
It is appropriate to describe the bloody history of Baidu e-commerce with “repeated defeats and repeated defeats”. YOUAH, which launched online in 2008, mainly focuses on C2C mode, confronting Taobao and threatening to “surpass Taobao in 3 years”. Baidu, which holds the advantage of flow, contributes a lot of flow to YOUAH, which can be converted into cash flow. A year later, Baidu, which was eager for quick success and instant profits, drastically reduced its traffic import and budget investment to YOUAH. YOUAH, which lost the strongest foreign aid, could hardly make a big difference. From then on, it was basically in name only, and finally announced its closure in April 2011.
In fact, in the late period of ah, Baidu has begun to change the runway. In June 2010, lekutian, a B2C shopping mall, went online, replacing YOUAH as Baidu’s vanguard in the e-commerce market. Baidu paid more attention to lekutian than YOUAH in terms of resource introduction and capital investment. However, the cooperation between Baidu and Lotte is not pleasant. Baidu did not inject capital into rakutian, only invested resources and traffic support. With 51% of its shares, Lotte wantonly arranged its own team. Both sides competed for the control of lekutian, and internal friction affected the operation quality of the platform.
Japan’s management authority is too large, and it does not understand the Chinese market. It thinks that e-commerce is not the existing method in China, and its market strategy is relatively conservative. At the end of 2011, the contradiction between the two sides intensified completely. After Baidu quit, it stopped diverting for Rakuten and changed to Lotte. Finally, it announced its closure in April 2012, with a loss of more than 100 million in two years. However, the failure of exploration of C2C and B2C did not dampen Baidu’s enthusiasm for e-commerce. In 2015, baidu made a comeback, and within one year, baidu future store, baidu VIP and Baidu mall were launched, but they all ended in failure.
Ali: come and go
In September 2013, Ali proposed the strategy of “all in wireless”. However, unexpectedly, it did not regard Taotao as the vanguard of the transformation of mobile, but chose heavy positions. Ma Yun personally went to the battle to promote contacts, and even said that “we should not consider listing if there is no success in wireless internet access”, requiring Ali employees to use contacts and more than 100 external friends, which can be seen from the degree of attention. However, he ignored the iron rule that it is not the second wechat that can defeat wechat. No matter how hard we communicate, we are doomed to live in the shadow of wechat.
In the early stage, wechat has built an unbreakable moat in the field of instant messaging by introducing QQ’s long-standing friendship chain and excellent product experience. As a latecomer, communication is faced with the fact that the cost of user migration is extremely high, and differentiation has become the key to break the situation. But it didn’t make complaints about it. Instead of being differentiated, it was not well received by netizens. Ding Lei, the head of NetEase, gave a negative score, which was less than 0 points.
Obviously, it is almost impossible to win over wechat only by burning money and subsidies. In the end, it did not open the market in the field of mobile social networking, covering only 10 million people. It was not in the same order of magnitude as the 600 million users of wechat at that time. Later, it was renamed “dianchongchong”. It transformed into the post-90s social networking that burned after reading and gave up the positive competition with wechat. In 2016, Ma Yun admitted the failure of contacts in Ali’s internal activities and said frankly that he was knocked out by a punch in the social field.
Tencent: short video
Tiktok has become a hot spot in recent years. Kwai Chung and fast hand have become the biggest winners. Tencent, which has long been deeply involved in content industry, will not let go of this fat. However, it has not launched a decent blockbuster to lead the industry. It’s not that Tencent doesn’t work hard, on the contrary, it makes great efforts. According to incomplete statistics, it has launched 17 short video products, including micro vision, Yoo video, dinner video, etc., but there is no real masterpiece except that the micro vision can barely play.
Considering that tiktok is not the same as the Tencent, the latter is Kwai Chung, the video is short, and the former is a pain in the heart of Ma Huateng. Kwai Kwai can be heard without end. The Tencent has been rumored to be deeply bound by the investment Sogou and tiktok models since the second half of last year. Although it has not been proved, it does not prevent the fast hand from becoming a trump card for the Tencent to check and balance. Of course, before the new round of investment and cooperation with Kwai Fu, Tencent still has to rely on its own micro vision to fight for short video tracks.
Although the tiktok performance is mediocre, far from Kwai and fast hands, it will not develop independently, but will be placed within the company and strive to do well. The reality is very cruel, let alone micro vision catch up with almost no hope, even to narrow the gap with the first echelon is not easy, which is related to the deep-rooted thinking of boutique. Tencent a number of short video products, whether PGC content or UGC content, are too much emphasis on the weight of high-quality products, but often not welcomed by users. You know, users shoot and watch short videos, neither to learn knowledge, nor to obtain information. They just want to spend time in the most relaxed state and enjoy themselves.
Byte skipping: multi flash
On January 15, 2019, the mobile social networking field is particularly lively, presenting a wonderful scene of “three British vs. Lv Bu”. Among them, the most notable is wechat, which is the multi flash war declaration under byte beating. Tiktok is a popular tiktok based social interaction. It is a birth of a golden spoon: a strong diversion of loud voice, a 100 million cash red envelope, and a famous variety show.
It’s a pity that Duoshan has a sense of desolation at the peak of his career. The development trend of opening high and going low can not support Zhang Yiming’s social dream. Qimai data shows that at the beginning of multi flash online, the number of downloads and the ranking of app store list were very eye-catching, but after a month, the ranking continued to decline. In my opinion, the power of multi flash has gradually dropped off the line, which has something to do with Tencent’s blocking. Not only has the press conference been blocked by wechat, but also the court has banned the use of wechat and QQ user information.
However, to say that, the main reason for the suck is that it is hard for users to do social interaction, and the cost of user migration is very high. This is the inherent advantage of WeChat. The relationship chain established by users on flash is neither fully nor reliable, and decides that flashing is not enough to replace WeChat’s position in the user’s mind. In July last year, duo Shan, whose development failed, was said to be “going to be cool and the team will change”. Although the official denied it, it is still alive and can’t make much waves.
Meituan: sharing power bank
In 2017, the sharing power bank became the favorite of the capital market, and the financing success stories were reported frequently. The major players started the crazy expansion mode with the capital support. At that time, meituan, which was not entangled with the boundary and core, was also interested in sharing the power bank. After a short test in Shijiazhuang, Qingdao and other places, it was shelved twice. In this regard, Wang Huiwen, co-founder of meituan, explained, “if the market scale in the future is not large enough, but the strategic synergy value is large enough, we can consider expanding the operation, otherwise we should close it, such as sharing the power bank.”
In August 2019, after more than two years of fierce fighting in the field of shared power bank, the market pattern of “three electricity and one animal” has initially taken shape, and all of them have achieved or are close to making profits. And meituan also chose to restart the project of sharing power bank at this time, but the water spray is still small. In May this year, meituan once again entered this field and set up a special team to recruit large-scale ground push and operation personnel, with more than 2000 people at present. It is not difficult to see that this time, the US delegation is determined to be more serious than the previous two times and vowed to make some achievements.
It is undeniable that meituan’s strong entry will bring certain pressure to the head players such as “three electrics and one beast”. After all, it naturally holds the business advantage, but it is difficult to shake the opponent’s advantage in the short term. Due to the first mover advantages accumulated by the head players in the scene layout and the increasingly complicated competition, meituan still needs to invest a lot of capital to leverage its own business resources. Whether it can succeed or not remains to be seen. In my opinion, meituan will not be able to catch up with the “three electrics and one beast” for a while, let alone pose a threat to them. There is still a long way to go in the future.
Didi: take out
In the spring of 2018, meituan entered the field of travel and entered didi hinterland. At that time, Didi, who was not willing to be outdone, launched takeout business and directly attacked the headquarters of meituan as a reciprocal response to the war with meituan. Relying on crazy subsidies, Didi’s takeout got the first good result on its first day online in Wuxi. While thanking users for their support, Didi leader Cheng Wei also made public for the first time the internal logic of Didi’s involvement in the field of takeout, “transportation to logistics, transportation of people to goods, didiwang to build a transportation network with extreme efficiency from point a to point B.”
However, Didi is ultimately a novice in the field of takeout, unable to rely on subsidies to solve all problems, and the improvement of operation details is also indispensable. So you will see that 9 days after the drop taking off line in Wuxi, although the subsidy intensity is still very large, the order volume has dropped more than 50%. An important reason is that the time of delivery is too long, and the customers make complaints about “single minute, two hour meal”, which not only Hallows the enthusiasm of users, but also discourages the brand businesses that focus on user experience.
Of course, user experience is not the last straw to crush Didi’s takeaway, but the hitchhiker safety incident in August 2018. In fact, the hitchhiker murder not only affects Didi’s business itself, but also increases the uncertainty of Didi, including business development and listing plan. Affected by this, in February 2019, Cheng Wei announced that the company would make preparations for the winter, and “shut down and transfer” the non main business. To put it bluntly, it is to lay off staff and cut down business. However, Didi delivery in only 5 cities in one year has naturally become the focus of contraction. It is difficult for China to become a big product, and it still needs efforts to go to sea. Today, Didi takeaway, which had been placed high hopes, can not become a good card on its own.
(statement: This article only represents the author’s point of view, not Sina’s position.)